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ABSTRACT. A relevant part of the literature around the metaphysical problem
of the persistence of concrete particulars has been charged of being too liberal on
the following respect: despite the fact that Four-Dimensionalism and Perduran-
tism are often treated as theories equivalent in content, they actually seem to be
different metaphysical doctrines. Parsons (2000) attempts to clarify the content
of these doctrines: his clarification is based on the postulation of a difference be-
tween temporal parts and temporal extension and it aims at demonstrating that
Four-Dimensionalism and Perdurantism are not tied by any a priori connection
and are not underpinned by the same ontological footing. In this work I endorse
Parsons’ clarification as legitimate from a logical and semantic point of view, but
I maintain that, in spite of his distinction between Perdurantism as a theory of
persistence and Four-Dimensionalism as a theory of extension, these doctrines are
ultimately equivalent, when it comes to formulating a general view about material
objects. Indeed, I argue that material objects extended four-dimensionally persist
by perduring, and perduring objects extend four-dimensionally in space-time.
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1 Introduction
Four-Dimensionalism and Perdurantism are normally conceived as inseparable if not even
equivalent. In fact, they are often both taken to require that objects extend four-dimensionally
by having temporal parts. For instance, Trenton Merricks (1995) uses perduring and four-
dimensional interchangeably and Ted Sider (2001, p. 68)1, in his influential treatise on Four-
Dimensionalism states: “I use the term [Four-Dimensionalism] in the sense of perdurance”.
However, the identity of Four-Dimensionalism and Perdurance Theory has been chal-
lenged by Josh Parsons (2000), who claims not only that Four-Dimensionalism and Perdu-
rantism are not equivalent, but also that no a-priori connection holds between them. With
reference to Jackson’s formulation of Four-Dimensionalism2, Parsons (2000, p. 399) states
that, in respect to the debate about temporal parts, “four-dimensionalism is a broader pro-
gramme that (allegedly) entails a certain specific theory of persistence, namely perduran-
tism”. Furthermore, as he argues, theoretically Four-Dimensionalism is not in disagreement
with Endurantism, according to which objects do not persist by having temporal parts but
by being wholly present at every moment at which they exist. Therefore, conceiving objects
four-dimensionally does not necessarily imply conceiving them as being made of temporal
parts.
Firstly, this work is aimed at delving into Parsons’ strategy, which is based on an attempt
to strengthen the distinction between Four-Dimensionalism and Perdurantism, inasmuch as
they constitute two theories different in kind and content, in order to make room for a plau-
sible combination of Four-Dimensionalism and Endurantism. Secondly, I will criticise some
of the weak points of Parsons’ metaphysical picture in order to show that, despite the fact
that Four-Dimensionalism and Perdurantism do not necessarily imply the very same theses,
there are valuable reasons to assert that these two theories must go together to provide an
effective account of reality.
2 Parsons’ Four-Dimensionalism without Temporal
Parts
While Four-Dimensionalism is usually known as the doctrine whose core states that entities
in space-time have four dimensions since they extend in time as well as in space, Parsons
distinguishes between two different theses constituting Four-Dimensionalism: the Dimen-
sionality Thesis and the Analogy Thesis. The Dimensionality Thesis claims that the universe
is a four-dimensional manifold of which one of the dimensions is time. This is, according
to Parsons, the central claim of Four-Dimensionalism, whereas the content of the Analogy
Thesis is merely “that time is somehow, strongly or weakly, analogous to space” (Parsons,
2000, p. 401). This latter thesis is not implied by the former, but it grants a solution to many
puzzles about time through the analogy with space. Parsons believes that these relevant
philosophical implications have led some philosophers, for example Heller (1990), to consider
the Analogy Thesis, erroneously, as the only relevant content of Four-Dimensionalism. In
particular, Heller’s mistake consisted in taking the Dimensionality Thesis for granted, and
making of the Analogy Thesis the only claim of his ‘minimal Four-Dimensionalism’.
1The term “Perdurantism” goes back to Lewis (1986).
2See (Jackson, 1998, p. 138).
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Many versions of the Analogy Thesis are possible, some stronger than others, but ulti-
mately all of them state that time is in some way similar to space. For instance, “a weaker
form of the Analogy Thesis could assert that time is just like space, except that objects fill
time by enduring, while they fill space by having spatial parts” (Parsons, 2000, p. 403). How-
ever, Parsons does not provide any criterion which we might base our choice of the degree of
‘weakness’ of the Analogy Thesis upon, and his argument makes use of the Analogy Thesis
in its strongest possible version. According to this version, time and space seem to be alike
tout court. Parsons’ purpose is to demonstrate that the fundamental theses defining Four-
Dimensionalism do not necessarily involve recourse to Perdurance Theory and to temporal
parts, since they can also be perfectly efficient in an ‘endurantist’ frame.
Parsons’ reasoning runs as follows: if we did not take the fact that things extend in space
by having spatial parts3 for granted, a position analogue to ‘Endurance Theory’ would be
available: call it ‘Entension Theory’. Whereas the former asserts that every material object
is wholly present at every time at which it exists, the latter states that material objects fill
space by being wholly located in each of several places. Parsons believes that if we had enough
empirical evidence to claim that some, if not all objects, entend, we would be bound to embrace
Endurance Theory as well, since the spatial analogy compels us to do so. Still, this picture
would be perfectly compatible with Four-Dimensionalism, conceived as the combination of
Dimensionality Thesis and Analogy Thesis, since none of these would be contradicted.
For an object to ‘entend’, it is necessary that it is wholly located in each of several places;
that means it has to extend in space without having parts. If we argued that extended objects
were composed of extensionless parts, we would run into a paradox, since extended objects
themselves would be extensionless. Therefore, we must admit the existence of ‘mereologically
simple’ objects which will correspond to the entending objects we are looking for. “What are
these entending simples? I think that it is most likely that they are the most fundamental
objects of physics, leptons and quarks” (Parsons, 2000, p. 404).
According to current physics these subatomic particles are ‘mereologically simple’ objects
and they correspond to the extreme limit which matter can be subdivided into. From these
premises, Parsons draws the conclusion that these objects have an extension while lacking
parts, and assumes that, even in case we might find even smaller particles, the questions
whether there are ‘mereologically simple’ objects and what they are like, should have empir-
ical answers.
Parsons does not explicitly consider these ‘mereologically simple’ objects to be the fun-
damental constituents of the ontology of material objects, although it is plausible that he
believes these objects to be somehow more fundamental than non-entending – or ‘pertend-
ing’ – objects. Nevertheless, his argument only aims at demonstrating “that some material
objects, not regions of space, entend” (Parsons, 2000, p. 405).
A common objection raised against the endurantist view is that its account of change leads
to the problem of temporary intrinsics, which is often brought up to support the ontology of
temporal parts. According to Lewis (1986, p. 202), “endurance involves overlap: the content
of two different times has the enduring thing as a common part”: therefore enduring objects
necessitate the coexistence of mutually exclusive properties, if we are not to deny the possi-
bility for an object to change. For instance, a window glass can be intact at T1 and broken at
T2: hence, if we are to consider the window glass as an object wholly present at every time at
3This position, according to which material objects extend in space by being divided into parts, is called by Parsons
‘Pertension Theory’, which is nothing but the analogue of Perdurance as far as extension of material objects in space
is concerned.
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which it exists, it will instantiate both the intrinsic properties4 of being intact and of being
broken. The very same problem may affect Parsons objects, which are intended as extending
in time by being wholly present at every time at which they exist.
How to account for change without running into the problem of temporary intrinsics, if
temporal parts are to be rejected? Parsons’ solution resorts to temporally indexed properties5,
which are intrinsic, non-relational and “should be understood in a way that makes it possible
for objects located at two different times to share such a property. If two pokers, created at
different times, were to have the same history of cooling down, and being destroyed, they
would share all their temporal indexed heat properties” (Parsons, 2000, p. 408).
These properties are distributional, since each of them accounts for certain distributions
of a characteristic of an object in time and space. They are also disjunctive, that is: “wherever
we have a temporally indexed property of being X-at-t, we have a number of corresponding
permanent distributional properties: the X-ness distributions, the ones that are compatible
with being X-at-t” (Parsons, 2000, p. 409). According to these claims, change is to have a
distribution that is non-uniform over time and does not compel us to admit the existence of
any sort of temporal part whatsoever.
Therefore Parsons attempts to open the way for a four-dimensional picture that does not
need the controversial concept of ‘temporal part’ and can account for change in an endurantist
perspective, apparently without running into the usual objections raised against the three-
dimensional endurantist picture, since distributional properties avoid the problem of tempo-
rary intrinsics by integrating the temporal dimension. Indeed, a distributional property is not
exemplified or non-exemplified by an object with reference to a single instant t, but it is ex-
emplified for more or less uniform temporal intervals, with reference to the whole “life-span”
of the object considered. Just like the colour red in a chequered white and red tablecloth is
exemplified on several and different occurrences along the whole extension of the tablecloth,
the same reasoning applies, roughly, to a poker which exemplifies the property of being hot.
The distributional property of being hot is not taken into accounted by considering the poker
at a fixed moment t1, in which, let’s say, the property is exemplified, and at another moment
t2, in which the property is not exemplified, but with reference to the irregular distribution
of the property along the whole “life-span” of the poker.
3 Objections against Parsons’ View and Minimal
Four-Dimensionalism
Parsons tells apart two assertions usually accepted as constituting the central nucleus of
Perdurance Theory, and very often believed to be fundamental to Four-Dimensionalism as
well:
1) The claim that ordinary objects have temporal parts;
2) The claim that ordinary objects have temporal extent.
As Hawley (2008, p. 202) points out, “the distinction is useful because it seems at least
conceivable that an object could be temporally extended without having temporal parts”.
4“A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is [. . . ] The intrinsic
properties of something depend only on that thing” (Lewis, 1983, p. 197).
5See (Van Inwagen, 1990).
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Parsons regards 1) as the chief content of Perdurance Theory, but not as a necessary en-
tailment of a four-dimensionalist position, whereas he considers 2) to be a central claim of
Four-Dimensionalism.
Similarly to the spatial case, in which those who believe in the possibility of spatially-
extended simples may also believe that an object can extend through a spatial region with-
out having a proper part in every proper sub-region of that region6, Parsons postulates
temporally-extended simples: objects extended over time but without temporal parts. In
this way, he opens the path for a plausible association of Four-Dimensionalism and En-
durantism and challenges the traditional picture, which combines of Perdurantism and Four-
Dimensionalism.
In this paragraph some objections against Parsons’ view will be formulated and examined
in order to answer the following question: is it necessary for a four-dimensional object to
have temporal parts? Despite Parsons’ attempt, I hold that the most plausible answer is still
‘yes’. In order to analyze Parsons’ strategy in more detail, I believe his reasoning may be
deconstructed into the following steps:
a) Decomposition of the nucleus of Four-Dimensionalism into two theses, Dimensionality
Thesis and Analogy Thesis, and attribution of the ‘guilt’ of making seemingly necessary
the recourse to temporal parts to the latter.
b) Choice of the strongest version of the Analogy Thesis and demonstration of its compatibil-
ity with Endurantism.
c) Postulation of the existence of ‘mereologically simple’ objects that have temporal extension
by lacking parts, underpinned by the analogy of how objects extend in space and how we
have enough empirical evidence to regard the existence of ‘mereologically simple’ objects
that have spatial extension by lacking parts as plausible.
As far as a) is concerned, Parsons (2000, pp. 399–400) draws a sharp separation between
the Dimensionality Thesis and the Analogy Thesis. This separation reflects and supports the
distinction made between 1) and 2): the claim that material objects have a temporal extent
(2) is as fundamental to Four-Dimensionalism as the Dimensionality Thesis is. On the other
hand, the claim that material objects are made of temporal parts (1) is not constitutive of
Four-Dimensionalism, while it is essential to Perdurantism. Parsons asserts that the origins
of the Dimensionality Thesis lie in the set of consequences of relativity theory, the Analogy
Thesis being possibly justified only inasmuch as it is a useful philosophical addition, since it
provides a solution to paradoxes about time and change.
However, a justification for the Analogy Thesis may also be rooted in the very same field
as the Dimensionality Thesis. Since one of the results of relativity theory is, roughly, that
space and time relations cannot be analysed separately if they are not considered within the
same frame of reference, a single unified representation of the spatiotemporal extension of
objects is necessary. Moreover, both the possibility of a graphic representation of spatiotem-
poral extension on a spatiotemporal diagram, and the principle that objects extend in time
in the same way as they extend in space, do not necessarily require the annihilation of the
differences between spatial relations and temporal relations. They can be regarded, instead,
as consequences of the treatment of time on a par with space and of the loss of meaning of
6See also (Markosian, 1983).
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the notions of absolute time and space. If we consider the second part of a), it must also be
noted that the Analogy Thesis is not always used as an argument for temporal parts, but
rather to illustrate what they are: “though I appeal to the analogy between spatial parts and
temporal parts in explaining the concept of temporal parts, I do not appeal to any analogy as
an argument for temporal parts” (Heller, 1992, p. 696)7.
Now let us turn our attention to b). Parsons believes that the strongest version of the
Analogy Thesis is the most difficult to combine with Endurantism. If it can be demonstrated
that this combination is possible, it follows that any incompatibility between Endurantism
and weaker versions of the Analogy Thesis is ruled out. However, the fact that weaker ver-
sions of the Analogy Thesis, as it will be shown, may be more problematic for Endurantism
than the strongest version, is taken for granted. Furthermore, no criterion is provided by
Parsons, on which we should base our choice of the degree of weakness of the Analogy The-
sis, when characterizing a particular four-dimensionalist theory. For instance, Heller (1992,
p. 696) claims that his version of the ontology of temporal parts accords better to weaker
versions of the Analogy Thesis: “it will prove important to my defence of the temporal parts
ontology to reject a complete analogy between space and time”. Parsons may therefore have
underestimated weaker versions of the Analogy Thesis as less forbidding enemies than the
strongest version.
Step c) consists of a postulation of ‘mereologically simple’ temporal objects, which extend
in time by lacking parts. The legitimacy of these entities derives from the analogy with space,
from the strongest version of the Analogy Thesis, in particular. Since the existence of these
entities does not contradict either of the two fundamental theses of Four-Dimensionalism,
they allow a combination of Four-Dimensionalism and Endurantism to be a plausible basis
for our ‘true’ ontology of material objects8. However, two main kinds of objections can be
formulated against the legitimacy of the reasoning that might lead us to introduce these
entities in our ontology:
1) Objections from empirical premises;
2) Objections from non-empirical premises.
1) Parsons argues that, since ‘mereologically simple’ spatial objects exist, and time is
exactly like space, ‘mereologically simple’ temporal objects may exist. The first problem that
stands out is of empirical nature. According to Parsons, the fact that some things ‘entend’,
i.e. have spatial extension by lacking parts, has many empirical premises and “whether some
things entend (as I have argued), or whether, on the contrary, everything pertends9 is an
empirical matter” (Parsons, 2000, p. 404). But if empirical evidence is our measure, we are
not bound to accept the thesis that time is exactly like space, since the possibility that at least
some differences between the spatial dimensions and the temporal dimension subsist has not
been ruled out yet10. For instance, we might mistakenly wind up believing that space and
time have the same density: in fact, since space is not dense, ‘mereologically simple’ spatial
7Hawley (2001) also points out that the soundness of the argument that goes from the unified treatment in-
ferred by Special Relativity to temporal parts is very debatable. However, as Heller points out, an argument is not
needed to introduce temporal parts in our ontology, as long as they are able to guarantee consistency and a stronger
explanatory capacity to an ontological theory.
8A structured and in depth exposition of Parsons’ ontology can be found in (Parsons, 2007, pp. 201–232).
9For a definition of “Pertension” see note 2.
10One among many examples consists in the commonsensical belief that, differently from the spatial dimensions,
the temporal dimension has a direction. The question whether covering the temporal dimension along both direc-
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objects must therefore exist, if we do not want to incur the Argument from Avogadro11. On
the grounds of the strongest version of the Analogy Thesis, according to which time is exactly
like space (i.e., not dense), ‘mereologically simple’ temporal objects must exist too. However,
we have no decisive empirical evidence that time is not dense12, therefore we have no decisive
empirical evidence to legitimate the introduction of ‘mereologically simple’ temporal objects
on an empirical basis.
2) Parsons’ argument is based, as we have seen, on the premise that there are some things
that entend. Setting aside the empirical presuppositions, I would like to reflect upon the
meaning of the theory of ‘Entension’ coined by Parsons to legitimate his ‘mereologically sim-
ple’ temporal objects through the analogy with space.
Since Endurance Theory states that objects are wholly present at every moment at which
they exist, Entension Theory, which is defined by Parsons as the equivalent for space of En-
durance Theory, entails that there are objects wholly located in each of several places. What
does this mean? If we attempt to explain how a world populated by mereologically simple
entending objects could be, I believe two possible scenarios can be given:
a) Each of these entending objects must fill exactly one unit only of space which is not any
further divisible, one place, and therefore these objects are wholly located, but in just one
place (at a time), in accord with the axiom that every ‘mereological simple’ occupies one
and only one point of space-time;
b) Entension is based on the assumption that mereological simple objects are the most fun-
damental objects of physics (i.e., leptons and quarks). These particles are not practically
decomposable any further. This derives from the fact that physical divisibility is assumed
as the privileged criterion to establish what is a ‘mereological simple’. However, the fact
that the most fundamental objects of physics cannot be subdivided into smaller parts,
might nevertheless be insufficient to rule out the possibility that our physical space is
composed by units even smaller than the particles by which these spatial units are occu-
pied. If this was the case, i.e. if every lepton or quark occupied more than one place at a
time, our mereologically simple spatial objects would be only partially located in each of
several places.
Option a) fails the requirements of Entension, according to which ‘mereologically simple’
spatial objects are multiply located at the same moment of time; option b) fails to meet the
requirement that entending objects are wholly located in all of the places in which they exist.
Since Parsons’ defines Entension Theory in analogy with Endurance Theory, it follows that
the same problem occurs when his ‘mereologically simple’ temporal objects are defined. For
instance, Hawley challenges the strict connection between Endurantism and Parsons’ view,
drawn by Parsons himself. She suggests that both enduring objects and Parsons’ objects lack
temporal parts, but while an enduring object is wholly present at each of several times, a
Parsonian object occupies a temporally extended region without being wholly present at any
single time.
tions, just like they were spatial dimensions, is (logically and/or empirically) possible or not roused the philosophical
debate concerning the possibility of time travels and the discussion of the consequential paradoxes (see Torrengo,
2011). Another example, which is below taken into account, concerns the problem of space and time density.
11See (Parsons, 2000, pp. 403–404)
12Many views in philosophy of time are based on the ancient principle that time is continuous (See for example
Aristotle, Physics VI, 2). For a recent example of a theory of time based on that principle, see Skow (2012, pp. 223–
242)’s version of the spotlight view. Indeed, the question whether or not time is dense is still open.
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The distinction between enduring objects and Parsons objects depends upon a
non-mereological distinction between occupying a spatiotemporal region by be-
ing multiply-located at various of its subregions, and occupying it by extending
through it, a distinction between two ways in which a simple object might conceiv-
ably occupy a region. (Hawley, 2008, p. 7)
Hawley believes that Parsons’ objects are different from enduring objects, since the former
fail to be wholly present at any single time. From this reasoning, it follows that Parsons does
not manage to provide a solid endurantist frame for Four-Dimensionalism, and his system
tends to collapse onto a view not very different from a three-dimensional picture13.
In fact, if we apply the two scenarios depicted for entending objects to enduring objects,
it results that these objects cannot subsist in a four-dimensional frame. Standard three-
dimensional continuants are objects with spatial parts and no temporal parts, which are
conceptualized in our experience as occupying space but not time, and as persisting wholes
through time. They exist entirely at every time at which they exist: they do not have temporal
parts through which they extend over time, but they endure over time. On the other hand,
Parsons’ four-dimensional enduring objects would occupy only one spatio-temporal region
(the smallest possible) and would be composed neither of spatial nor of temporal parts. These
objects would be spatio-temporally extended without having parts. However, as we have seen,
this claim is justified, as far as the temporal dimension is concerned, only on the basis of an
absolute analogy between space and time.
By applying scenario a) to the temporal dimension of Parsons’ objects, it follows that these
objects, even though they would not fail to meet the requirement of being four-dimensional,
since they would have a temporal extension, would fail to meet the requirement of being en-
during objects, since they couldn’t have a temporal extension without having temporal parts.
For an object to be four-dimensional, an extension along the temporal dimension is needed,
but we do not have enough empirical evidence to support an absolute analogy between spatial
and temporal dimensions, and therefore to accept the fact that objects can have a minimal
temporal extension that cannot be subdivided into further parts. If Parsons’ objects were
to preserve a duration over time, they would need at least to ‘sweep’ over time, like three-
dimensional objects do.
According to scenario b), Parsons’ objects would occupy more than one spatio-temporal
unit, therefore they would extend in spacetime by having parts. As far as their extension
along the temporal dimension is concerned, they would be nothing but four-dimensional per-
during objects.
4 Do we need Parsons’ distinction? A proposal of
“Minimal Four-Dimensionalism”
I believe Parsons’ distinction between temporal extent and temporal parts should be taken
into account when formulating a definition of Four-Dimensionalism, since it allows a logical
distinction between two expressions which do not designate the same concept. Nevertheless,
from an ontological point of view – and for as much empirical groundings as we want our
ontology to be underpinned by – Endurance Theory fails to provide an appropriate frame for
Four-Dimensionalism, and the recourse to temporal parts seems to remain inevitable.
13This point has been discussed with Katherine Hawley, whom I thank for the significant prompts.
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Therefore, I believe the main requirements of a minimal Four-Dimensionalism boil down
to the following claims:
1) The universe is a four-dimensional manifold of which one of the dimensions is time14;
2) Material objects extend four-dimensionally in space-time. They have a spatial as well as a
temporal extension.
The assertion that four-dimensional objects extend in time in the same way that they ex-
tend in space does not entail that time and space must have the same kind of ‘simples’ or
the same way of being divided into parts. The fact that it is not possible to consider spa-
tial relations and time relations as being absolute outwith a frame of reference, simply does
not allow us to consider absolute spatial and temporal parts. If we follow Parsons, build-
ing the concept of ‘temporal part’ into the definition of minimal Four-Dimensionalism brings
implications that derive from a combination of Four-Dimensionalism and Perdurantism. The
principle that objects ‘extend’ in time, instead of ‘moving or sweeping in time’, or ‘being wholly
present at every instant’ guarantees in itself the analogy with space, since in both the tem-
poral and the spatial case we are considering a relative extension in one (or more) of the four
dimensions of the manifold.
Nevertheless, I believe a fundamental reason stands out, which requires an effective def-
inition of ‘minimal Four-Dimensionalism’ to include also the principle that four-dimensional
objects extend in time by having temporal parts. This reason has to do with the fact that
Four-Dimensionalism in combination with Endurantism tends, as we have seen, to flatten to
a sort of three-dimensionalist view. Although Four-Dimensionalism itself does not logically
entail Perdurantism – as much as ‘temporal extension’ might not logically imply ‘temporal
part’, if we believe in temporally-extended simples – as Parsons clearly pointed out, as a
matter of fact Four-Dimensionalism is not in a condition to provide an effective account of
material objects persisting over time if not recurring to temporal parts, which are ontolog-
ically necessary to make sense of Four-Dimensionalism. Therefore, I believe that 1) and 2)
need to be supplemented by the following principle:
3) Four-dimensional objects extend in time by having temporal parts.
5 Conclusions
I attempted to show that Parsons’ combination of Four-Dimensionalism and Endurantism has
some weak points. In the first place, I argue against the empirical and non-empirical premises
on which Parsons grounds the strongest version of spatial analogy that he endorses. In the
second place, I claim that, even if it were the case that this analogy was justified enough,
Parsons’ four-dimensional enduring objects would nonetheless fail to be contemporarily four-
dimensional and enduring.
In conclusion, I maintain that, despite Parsons’ distinction between Perdurantism as a
theory of persistence and Four-Dimensionalism as a theory of extension, from an ontological
point of view these doctrines are inextricably entangled, when it comes to formulating a
general metaphysical theory on material objects. Indeed, I argue that objects extended four-
dimensionally – persist by perduring, and perduring objects extend four-dimensionally in
space-time15.
14This corresponds to Parsons’ Dimensionality Thesis.
15I thank Giuliano Torrengo and Paolo Valore for their priceless help and support during the revision of the paper.
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